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ARGUMENT 
The arguments by appellees Fleetwood Services, Inc. ("Fleetwood") or 
Wilshire Insurance Company ("Wilshire") do not justify affirmance of the 
contested trial court's rulings, as explained below. 
Fleetwood's Arguments 
1. Appeal is moot and court is without jurisdiction. Fleetwood first 
argues that because the underlying consent judgment supposedly expired on March 
27, 2017, the appeal is moot and should be dismissed. Here, Fleetwood is 
mistaken for numerous reasons. First, Fleetwood's argument focuses solely on the 
judgment that was entered, and ignores Espenschied's separate settlement 
~ agreement. Espenschied remains bound by a settlement agreement in which it is 
obligated, among other things, to pay $1.1 million (plus interest). Indeed, the 
~ judgment is not even mentioned in the settlement agreement, let alone dispositive 
ofEspenschied's obligations. (See Addendum Exh. 3 hereto, R. 1771-1781.) 
In any event, Fleetwood incorrectly assumes that the eight year limitation in 
either bringing an action on a judgment or in renewing the judgment is 
determinative of the issues. Plaintiff/appellant Espenschied Transport Corp. 
expressly agreed to toll the limitations and to waive the application of any 
limitation. It has likewise acknowledged the full validity of the judgment. See 
Addendum Exh. 1, ,r,r 6-7, and Exh A attached thereto, ,r,r 5-7. Accordingly, the 
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court in the consent judgment proceedings renewed the judgment on August 15, 
2017. See Addendum Exh. 2. 
This Court held that a renewed judgment "gives new life to a party's original 
judgment". Gildea v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA., 2015 UT 11, ,I 30, 347 P.3d 385. 
Thus, the original consent judgment based on the settlement between the Herrods 
and Espenschied has remained void throughout the entire course of this litigation. 
Setting aside the fact that there has been a renewal of the judgment, 
Fleetwood's arguments are misguided. The relevant statutes read as follows: 
An action may be brought within eight years upon a judgment or decree of 
any court of the United States, or of any state or territory within the United 
States. 
Utah Code Anno. § 78B-2-31 l. 
Judgments shall continue for eight years from the date of entry in a court 
unless previously satisfied or unless enforcement of the judgment is stayed 
in accordance with law. 
Utah Code Anno. § 78B-5-202 (1). 
A court of record may renew a judgment issued by a court if: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
a motion is filed within the original action; 
the motion is filed before the statute of limitations on the original 
judgment expires; 
the motion includes an affidavit that contains an accounting of the 
original judgment and all post judgment payments, credits, and 
other adjustments which are provided for by law or are contained 
within the original judgment; 
the facts in the supporting affidavit are determined by the court to 
be accurate and the affidavit affirms that notice was sent to the 
most current address known for the judgment debtor; 
2 
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(5) 
(6) 
the time for responding to the motion has expired; and 
the fee required by Utah Code Anno. Subsection 78A-2-301(1)(1) 
has been paid to the clerk of the court. 
Utah Code Anno., § 78B-2-3 l 1. 
Each of the above statutes has been met. Utah Code Anno. § 78B-2-311 
requires that any action upon a judgment may be brought within eight years. The 
~ present action, which is an action to recover money to satisfy the judgment, was 
commenced on September 14, 2007. R. 1-11. 
Utah Code Anno. § 78B-2-311 provides that a judgment shall continue for 
eight years unless "enforcement of the judgment is stayed". Here, at the request of 
Espenschied and Fleetwood, the trial court stayed the present case on 
September 30, 2011, "this action shall be stayed until further order of the Court." 
R. 1273-1276. The trial court never issued an order lifting the stay, but on 
April 11, 2012, the court issued an Order to Show Cause and Scheduling 
Conference. R. 1279-1280. At the hearing on May 23, 2012, the parties reported 
i..JJ the status and advised the court of the stay. R. 1281. 
On March 12, 2013, the court issued another order to show cause. R. 1285. 
Thereafter, Wilshire moved the trial court to continue the stay, to which Fleetwood 
joined. R.1308-1315; 1322-1323. Espenschied opposed the motions to continue 
the stay arguing that the Herrod judgment against Espenschied is independent of 
any federal action. R. 1327-1330. "Espenschied has already waited almost six 
3 
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years to have its claims resolved. There is no justification for further delay and 
Espenschied is entitled to have its claims resolved." Id. 1330. The court did not ~ 
issue an order to lift the stay. 
In another pretrial hearing on November 18, 2014, the parties reported to the 
court that the federal action was completed and the present action could proceed. 
R. 13 69. Thus, this case was stayed for over three years, which would exceed any 
claimed expiration of the judgment. 
As it relates to Utah Code Anno. § 78B-2-311, the judgment has been 
renewed. The only relevant condition for its renewal is that a motion be filed 
"before the statute of limitations on the original judgment expires". The limitation 
period had not expired because: ( 1) Espenschied had agreed to toll and waive the 
running of the limitation; and (2) the present case had been stayed for over three 
years, which would extend the limitation period accordingly. 
Utah has long accepted the consensual tolling of statutes of limitations. For 
example, a judgment debtor may agree to toll the limitation, or waive the 
application of a limitation. LeFevre v. Stout (In re Estate of LeFevre), 2009 UT 
App 286, ,I 31,220 P.3d 476 (statute of limitations is a waivable defense); Keller v. 
Southwood N. Med. Pavilion, Inc., 959 P.2d 102, 106 (Utah 1998) (same); James v. 
Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 573-74 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). This Court has jurisdiction 
and the matter is not moot. 
4 
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Here, Fleetwood and Wilshire have wrongfully denied Espenschied 's claims. 
vi From the outset, this litigation has been to hold Fleetwood and Wilshire 
responsible for failing to provide the statutorily mandated trucker's insurance. The 
Herrods are part of the public for which such insurance is designed to protect. This 
litigation has been ongoing for nearly ten years. These claims against Fleetwood 
and Wilshire are the only means whereby the Herrods may recover for their 
personal injuries. 
2. Unpaid judgments are not damages. Fleetwood argues that certain 
cases from other jurisdictions support its position that an unpaid judgment cannot 
be used to establish damages in claims against agents and brokers. Fleetwood 
vtJ relies on Valentine v. Membrila Ins. Services, Inc., 118 Cal. App. 4th 462, 476, 13 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 125, 136 (2004) ("Valentine"), and argues that its facts are similar to 
v-' DC-10 Entertainment, LLC v. Manor Insurance Agency, Inc, 308 P.3d 1223 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 2013 ), upon which Espenschied relies. Fleetwood then points out that the 
Valentine case arrives at an opposite result. 
Fleetwood's argument is misplaced. Valentine offered four reasons why it 
believed that a judgment coupled with a covenant not to execute does not give rise 
to recovery against a broker. First, where the facts needed to determine whether an 
insurer has a duty to defend are easy to assemble, there is uncertainty about when a 
broker's duty to defend arises. Id. at 473. Second, insurers acting in bad faith are 
5 
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more blameworthy than brokers who negligently fail to procure insurance, and it is 
this blameworthiness that justifies a procedure that, in the opinion of the court, 
invites collusion and fraud. Id. at 474. Third, unlike an insurer, whose bargaining 
strength dwarfs that of an insured, a broker may have less knowledge and 
sophistication concerning a specialized area of commercial insurance than its 
client. Id. Fourth, a stipulated judgment, standing alone, is not a fair barometer of 
the damages caused by a broker's negligence. Id. at 476. These reasons are 
unpersuasive or otherwise inapposite to the facts at hand. 
Valentines discussion about a broker not knowing when its duty to defend 
has arisen is inapposite to the facts at hand. Unlike the case in Valentine, 
Espenschied's attorney specifically requested that Fleetwood defend it. 
Valentines discussion of the blameworthiness of an insurer versus a broker 
is also not applicable here. An insurer's decision to deny coverage is not always the ~ 
result of bad faith. An insurer can err in denying coverage, without acting in bad 
faith, if the denial of coverage is fairly debatable. Such a denial would be no more 
blameworthy than negligently failing to procure insurance, especially where, as is 
the case with Espenschied and Fleetwood, there is a twenty-year history of reliance 
and trust. 
Valentines third reason regarding the potential sophistication of an insured 
over a broker is also inapposite to Espenschied's facts. Espenschied had relied on 
6 
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~ 
Fleetwood 's knowledge and expertise for over twenty years. Espenschied 
concentrated on trucking and it was very good at serving its customers. Its owners 
and employees knew very little about insurance other than that they wanted all of 
their equipment covered. Fleetwood was more knowledgeable about the 
particularities of Wilshire's policies, having served as Wilshire's exclusive 
producer in the Salt Lake City and being one of Wilshire's largest Utah producer. 
Viewing the facts most favorably to Espenschied leads to the conclusion that 
Fleetwood was much more sophisticated and knowledgeable about the coverage 
Espenschied should have. 
Valentine~ fourth reason for rejecting consent judgments relates to the 
fairness that it may not reflect the true damages. Here, the magnitude of damages 
alleged by Herrods and the likelihood of a finding of liability on Espenschied was 
high. The damages of the Herrods' economist placed the present value of just the 
economic losses between $16,141,963 and $21,634,590. Non-economic damages 
would be in addition to this figure. There were also personal injuries to the other 
members of the Herrod family. Even a small percentage of fault such as 20% 
would equate to economic losses in the range of over $3 million against 
Espenschied. A reasonable argument could be made that the settlement, which 
capped the exposure, would also benefit Fleetwood. 
7 
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Compelling policy reasons would justify shifting the risk to the agent or 
broker, who typically has errors and omission liability insurance to cover its own ~ 
negligence. The agents or brokers liability for failure to procure insurance should 
not tum on whether the customer is able to pay a settlement or judgment. 
Wilshire's Arguments. 
1. Complaint fails to allege that Fleetwood is Wilshire's agent. Wilshire 
argues that this Court should not consider Espenschied' s argument that Wilshire is 
liable for the conduct of Fleetwood, its agent, because the complaint does not 
explicitly allege that Fleetwood was the agent of Wilshire. Wilshire Brief, pp. 24-
25. Wilshire concedes, however, that the trial court did not make any ruling in this 
regard (id., p. 24); rather the trial court addressed the issue of agency on the merits. 
Nonetheless, to support its argument, Wilshire cites to Big Sky Fin. Co. v. Lawyers 
Title Ins. Corp., 2006 UT App. 337. In this case, however, the trial court and Utah 
Court of Appeals ruled directly on the adequacy of the complaint rather than ruling 
on the merits of the agency issue. 
In the present case, the trial court decided to directly address the merits of 
the agency issue rather than rule on the adequacy of the complaint. In fact, the 
order of the trial court ( which was prepared by Wilshire) never even mentions the 
complaint in this regard. R. 3183-3189. 
8 
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Under U.R.Civ.P. 15(b)(l), if the matter which is not raised in the pleadings 
is tried, it is considered part of the pleadings. 
Id. 
When an issue not raised in the pleadings is tried by the parties' express or 
implied consent, it must be treated in all respects as if raised in the 
pleadings. A party may move-at any time, even after judgment-to amend 
the pleadings to conform them to the evidence and to raise an unpleaded 
issue. But failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of that issue. 
Based on the extensive discovery regarding whether Fleetwood was 
Wilshire's agent, the agency issue was extensively briefed below by both 
Espenschied and Wilshire, attaching depositions and documents to support their 
respective positions. R. 1846-1847, 2607-2610, and 2838-2839. In Wilshire's 
vib Statement of Facts section in its motion for summary judgment, Wilshire describes 
the facts in detail from which it then argues that Fleetwood was not its agent. R. 
1828-1832. The trial court "tried" the agency issue and made specific findings and 
conclusions regarding agency without mentioning the lack of allegations in the 
complaint. Under Rule 15 (b )(1 ), this matter has been tried as if the agency issue 
was pied. There is no ruling from the trial court for this court to review regarding 
the adequacy of the complaint. 
2. Reasonable expectations regarding Fleetwood as Wilshire's agent. 
Wilshire argues that Utah has rejected the reasonable expectation doctrine. This 
"" argument, however, is misplaced. Utah has rejected the doctrine of reasonable 
9 
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expectations when applied to invalidate provisions in an insurance contract. Allen 
v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P .2d 798, 804 (Utah 1992). This, ~ 
however, misses Espenschied's point. 
Espenschied argues that it is entitled to reasonably rely on Fleetwood's 
representations and the historical course of dealings with Fleetwood over a 
twenty-year period. If Fleetwood is also the agent of Wilshire, the reliance is 
equally binding on Wilshire. 
3. Fleetwood not acting as Wilshire's agent. Wilshire argues that 
Fleetwood is not its agent, relying on the case of Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co. of N. Y., 
761 P.2d 581 (Utah App. 1988). However, in finding that an insurance broker was 
not an agent for an insurer, the court in Vina did not base its decision on the mere ~ 
fact that the broker did not have authority to bind insurance. 761 P.2d at 586. The 
Vina court, instead, looked at all the facts and circumstances of the case, including ~ 
the fact that the broker had no prior dealings with the insurer who issued the policy 
to the plaintiffs. Id. Here, Fleetwood had extensive dealings with Wilshire, and 
according to the agency agreement, had authority to bind coverage within the 
guidelines set out by Wilshire. R. 2636. In any event, there is no Utah law 
dictating that the principles of agency only apply to an agent with binding 
authority. At a very minimum, there are issues of fact that preclude summary 
judgment on this issue. 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, appellant Espenschied respectfully requests 
that this Com1 reverse the summary judgments in favor of both Fleetwood and 
Wilshire and remand the case for trial. 
DA TED this 1st day of September, 2017. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
Isl Karra J Porter 
Karra J. Porter 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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L. Rich Humpherys, 1582 
Humpherys Law PLLC 
36 South State Street. Suite 1900 
Salt Lake City, lrf 841 l l 
Tel: 8012393140 
Karra J. Porter 
CHRlSTENSE:--.1 &JENSEN, P.C. 
257 East 200 South, Suite 1900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (80 I) 323-5000 
Facsimile: (801) 355-3472 
Attorneys.for Herrods 
L"l THE THlRD .J U.DICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CA THERINE HERROD, SCOTT HERROD. 
TAYLORHERROD,MATTHEW 
HERROD, ELIZABETH HERROD, NILES 
HERROD AND JANET HERROD. 
Plaintiffs. 
vs. 
ESPENSCHIED TRANSPORT 
CORPORA TJON., a Utah Corpordtion, aka 
ESPENSCHIED TRANSPORT, INC. 
Defendant. 
STIPULATION Al\'D JOINT 110TION 
TO RE~E\V JUDGMENT 
Misc. No. 090905058 
The parties hereby stipulate and jointly move the court as follows: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STIPULATION 
I. On or aboui June 26, 2007. Espenschied Transport Corp entered into a 
settlement agreement with Catherine P. Herrod, (individually and on behalf of Scott 
He1Tod, Taylor Herrod, Vf atthew Herrod and Elizabeth Herrod, minors), Niles Herrod 
and Janet Herrod ('"He1TOds,,) regarding the claims that the Herrods had against 
Espenschied for wrongful death and personal injuries. 
2. As a pa11 of the settlement agreement, Espenschied agreed to pay Herrods 
the amount of $1,100.000 together with interest at the rate of IO% per annum from June 
26, 2007, (the date of the settlement agreement) until paid. Hcrrods agreed to collect this 
amount o,ving from Espenschied's liability insurer, Wilshire Insurance Company 
(''Wilshire") and/or Fleetwood Services, Inc., Espenschied's insurance broker 
("Fleetwood"). 
3. Pursuant to the agreement, Espenschied agreed to take what measures 
were necessary and to fully cooperate in pursuing these claims against Wilshire and 
Fleetv.'ood. As pan of this agreement, Espenschied consented to the judgment which was 
entered in the above matter executed by this cowi on March 27, 2009 and entered on 
April 3, 2009 (the "Judgment"). 
4. Since that time, Espenschied has been engaged in pursuing the claims 
against Wilshire and Fleetvwod in the action entitled Espenschied Transport Corp. v. 
Wilshire insurance Company and Fleetwood Services, Inc., Court No. 070913289, in the 
Third District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, presently on appeal to the Utah 
Supreme Cou11, Case No. 20160873-SC ("Espenschied Claims''). 
2 
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5. To eliminate any issue relating to the validity of the Judgment, the parties 
seek to have the Judgment herein renewed. The Statute of Limitations period of eight 
years to renew a judgment has expired; however, Espenschied acknowledges that it has 
waived the Statute of Limitation defense, agreed that the Statute of Limitations on the 
Judgment is tolJed while the Espenschied Claims are being pursued against Wilshire and 
Fleetwood, and agreed that sa·id Judgment remains enforceable and valid. Throughout the 
eight year period, I have also repeatedly acknowledged Espenschied' s obligation to the 
Herrods in writing, in my depositions. and in the pleadings filed in the case involving 
Espenschied's Claims against Wilshire and Fleetwood. See Declaration of Bryan 
Espenschied~ attached as Exhibit A hereto. 
6. The amount owing under the Judgment is justly due to the Herrods. Since 
the payment of the Judgment is based on the success of the Espenschied Claims, 
Espenschied has not paid any amount toward the Judgment and the full amount plus 
interest remains owing. 
.., 
,. Espenschied acknowledges and agrees that the Judgment should be 
renewed to avoid any argwnent by Wilshire or Fleet\vood that Espenschied has suffered 
no damage and cannot pursue the Espenschied Claims. 
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JOINT MOTIO:\f 
Pursuant to the above stipulation, the parties jointly move the. court to execute and 
enter a renewed judgment based on the same tem1s as the original Judgment. Said 
proposed judgment is filed herewith and is approved by both parties. 
Dated this 14th day of August. 2017. 
HUM"PHERYS LAW, PLLC 
Isl L. Ric.h Humpherys 
L. Rich Humpherys 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, PC 
Isl Karra J. Porter 
Karra J: P ortcr 
Attorneys for Catherine P. Herrod, 
(individual~y and on beha(f of Scott Herrod, 
Taylor Herrod, .l,1atthe·w Herrod and 
Elizabeth Herrod, minors), Niles Herrod 
and Janet Herrod (''Herrods ") 
ESPENSCHIED TRANSPORT CORP 
At -~ .. By;,r.,1,,,. to  ¼« ,,- ,./2.,,£.. 
BryaryJ. , spe schied 
Authoriztd Agent for Espenschied 
Transport Corp. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this 14th day of August, 2017., I hereby certify that the original and copy of the 
above STIPULATION AND JOINT MOTION TO RENEW JUDGMENT was 
personally delivered to Bryan J. Espenschied and that he executed and approved the same 
for and on behalf of Espenschied Transport Corp. 
L. Rich Humpherys 
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l. Rich Humpherys, 1582 
Humpherys Law PLLC 
36 South State Street, Suite 1900 
SaH Lake City, UT 84111 
Tel: 8012393140 
KaiTa J. Porter 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
257 East 200 South, Suite 1900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 323-5000 
Facsimile: (801) 355-3472 
Attorneys.for Herrods 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CA THERTKE HERROD, SCOTT HERROD, 
TAYLOR HERROD, MATTHEW 
HERROD, ELIZABETH HERROD, NILES 
HERROD AND JANET HERROD, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ESPEJ\'SCHIED TRANSPORT 
CORPORATION., a Utah Corporation, aka 
ESPENSCHIED TRANSPORT, JNC. 
Defendant. 
DECLARA. TION O.F BRYAN J. 
ESPE.'.'lSCHIED 
Misc. No. 090905058 
1, Bryan J. Espenschied, hereby declare as follows: 
I. During all relevant times, l have been a principal and pait owner of Espenschied 
Transport Corp, a Utah Corporation ("Espenschied"). This company has ceased doing business, 
except for completing the resolution of the above action and related matters. T have been and am the 
authorized representative to speak and act on behalf of Espenschied in this matter. 
2. To settle the wrongful death and personal injury claims of the above mentioned 
Plaintiffs (the "Herrods") against Espenschied relating to a very tragic accident involving a trailer 
owned by Espenschied, Espenschied entered into a settlement agreement with the above named 
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Plaintiffs on June 26, 2007. As a part of the settlement agreement, Espenschied agreed to pay 
Herrods the amount of $1, l 00,000 together with interest at the rate of 10% per annum from June 26, 
2007, (the date of the settlement agreement) until paid. He1rnds agreed to collect this amount 
owing from Espenschied's liability insurer, Wilshire Insurance. Company (""Wilshire") and/or 
Fleetwood Services, Inc., Espenschied's insurance broker ("Fleetwood"). 
3. Pursuant to the agreement, Espenschied agreed to take what measures were 
necessary and to fully cooperate in pursuing these claims against Wilshire and Fleetwood. As part 
of this agreement, Espenschied consented to the judgment which was entered in the above matter 
executed by this court on March 27~ 2009 and entered on April 3, 2009 (the "Judgment"). 
4. Since that time~ Espenschied has been engaged in pursuing the claims against 
Wilshire and Fleetvwod in the action entitled Espenschied Transport Corp. v. Wilshire Insurance 
Company and Fleer.-vood Services. Inc.~ Court No. 070913289, in the Third District Court for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, presently on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, Case No. 20160873-
SC ("Espenschied Claims"). 
5. I understand that there is a Statute of Limitations of eight years on a claim to renew 
. a judgment, as found in Section 78B-2-3 l l of the Utah Code. The Statute of Limitations period of 
eight years to rene\ll the Judgment has expired; however, Espenschied has waived the Statute of 
Limitation and agreed that the Statute of Limitations on the Judgment is tolled while the 
Espenschied Claims are being pursued. Espenschied acknowledges and agrees that said Judgment 
remains enforceable and valid. Espenschied has understood, expressed and intended from the outset 
of the settlement t11at the He1wds were relying on Espenschied's cooperation to have the judf.>ment 
valid as long as the Espenschied Claims were pending against Wilshire and 
Fleetwood. Espenschied has therefore agreed to waive or toll any statute of limitation that would 
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affect the judgment's validity. Throughout the eight year period, I have also repeatedly 
acknowledged Espenschied's obligation to the Herrods in writing, in my depositions, and in the 
pleadings fi1ed in the case involving .Espenschied's Claims against Wilshire and Fleetwood. 
6. The amount owing under the Judgment is justly due to the Herrods. Since the 
payment of the Judgment is based on the success of the Espenschied Claims against Wilshire and 
Fleetwood, Espenschied has not paid any amount toward the Judgment and the full amount plus 
interest remains owing. 
7. Espenschied acknowledges and agrees that the Judgment should be renewed. 
I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah and applicable federal laws that the 
above is true and correct to the best ofmy knowledge, understanding and belief. 
Dated this 14th day of August, 2017 
t?L~ ~~£/ __ . --
~n Y Esp schied 
Authffized agent and representative of Espenschied 
Transport Corp., 
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The Order of the Court is stated below: 
Dated: August 15. 2017 Isl ROBERT FAUST 
L. Rich Humpherys, i 582 
Humpherys Law PLLC 
36 South State Street, Suite 1900 
Salt Lake City, UT 8411 I 
Tel: 8012393140 
Karra J. Porter 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
257 East 200 South, Suite 1900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 323-5000 
Facsimile: (801) 355-3472 
Attorneys for Herrods 
11 :39:38 AM District Court Judge 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CATHERINE HERROD, SCOTT HERROD, 
TAYLOR HERROD, MATTHEW 
HERROD, ELIZABETH HERROD, NILES 
HERROD AND JANET HERROD, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ESPENSCHIED TRANSPORT 
CORPORATION., a Utah Corporation, aka 
ESPENSCHIED TRANSPORT, INC. 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Misc. No. 090905058 
Based upon the Joint Stipulation and Motion to Renew the Judgement and the 
Declaration of the Defendant filed herein, the Court hereby grants the motion and issues 
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the following judgment. 
The JUDGMENT herein executed by the court on March 27, 2009 and entered in 
the Registry of Judgments on the 3rd day of April, 2009, against Espenschied Transport 
Corp, in favor of Catherine Hen-od, Scott Herrod, Taylor Herrod, Matthew Herrod, 
Elizabeth Herrod, Niles Hen-od and Janet Herrod shall be renewed based on the same 
terms and conditions as stated in the original judgment. 
Accordingly, Catherine Hen-od, Scott Herrod, Taylor Herrod, Matthew Herrod, 
Elizabeth Herrod, Niles Herrod and Janet Herrod shall have JUDGMENT against 
Espenschied Transport Corp, for the amount of $1,292,499.99, together with post 
judgment interest from March 27, 2009, at the rate of 10% per annum, until paid. 
***Executed and entered by the Court as indicated by the date 
and seal at the top of the first page*** 
Approved as to fonn and content: 
/s/ Bryan J. Espenschied (signature on file) 
Bryan J. Espenschied 
Authorized Agent for Espenschied 
Transport Corp 
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EXHIBIT A TO CONTINGENCY FEE AGREEMENT 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
Agreement is made this Ji, ~day of June, 2007, between and among Catherine P. 
Herrod, (individually and on behalf of Scott Herrod, Taylor Herrod, Matthew Herrod and 
/ 
Elizabeth Herrod), Niles Herrod and Janet Herrod ("Herrods'') and Espenschied Transport 
Corporation, J. Richard Stark, and Bryan J. Espenschied ("Espenschied"). 
WHEREAS, Herrods are the heirs of Kimball Herrod and the owners of wrongful death 
and/or personal injury claims arising out of an automobile accident which occurred January 30, 
2005, on Interstate 15 at or near Woods Cross, Utah, when dual tires on a 1986 Timpte trailer 
(''Trailer'') owned by Espenschied came off their axle at freeway speeds, crossed the median and 
hit the Herrods' vehicle, killing Kimball Herrod ("Accident,,); 
WHEREAS~ prior to the Accident, Espenschied had entered into an agreement to lease 
and later sell the Trailer and other equipment to DATS Trucking, Inc. ("DATS"), wherein DATS 
agreed to provide Espenschied with insurance and to indemnify Espenschied for any claims 
arising out of the use or maintenance of the Trailer and other equipment subject to the lease and 
sale; 
WHEREAS, DATS has denied any liability to Espenschied and contests Espenschied,s 
claims for insurance and indemnity; 
· WHEREAS, prior to the accident, Espenschied had requested of its insurance 
agent/broker, Fleetwood Services, Inc. ("Fleetwood'') and Fleetwood agreed to obtain 
automobile liability insurance for the Trailer and for Espenschied, s other equipment with 
coverage meeting the insurance requirements of Espenschied' s customers as well as the federal 
law; 
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WHEREAS, Espenschied claims that Wilshire Insurance Company, or one of its 
affiliated companies, ("Wilshire") issued a motor vehicle liability policy to Espenschied, to 
insure the Trailer and other equipment of Espenschied; 
WHEREAS, Espenschied gave notice of the Herrods' claims to its insurer, Wilshire, 
whereupon, Wilshire denied any responsibility for such claims and refused to defend 
Espenschied on the grounds that it provided no coverage for the Trailer; 
WHEREAS, Espenschied then made claims against its agent/broker Fleetwood for 
purportedly failing to secure the requested coverage for the Trailer, however, Fleetwood likewise 
denied any responsibility for the claim; 
WHEREAS, Espenschied has been required to incur defense costs, including attorney's 
fees, court costs and related expenses, in defending Espenschied against_ the Herrods' claims and 
in pursuing cross-claims against DATS (''Defense Costs"); 
WHEREAS, Espenschied faces uncertain but potentially serious exposure from the 
Herrods' claims and desires through a settlement with the Herrods to eliminate the possible 
exposure and the ongoing Defense Costs; 
NOW, THEREFORE, for the terms and conditions set forth below and other good and 
valuable consideration, the parties agree as follows: 
1. Herrods agree to settle all claims they may have against Espenschied for the 
amount of $1>100,000, together with interest at the rate of 10% per annum which will accrue 
from the date hereof until paid. 
2. Herrods agree to withhold collection on the non-insurance assets ( excluding the 
claims against third parties, set forth below) of Espenschied until such time as said claims against 
the third parties have been fully settled, waived, released, litigated and/or resolved (including 
2 
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,,, ... 
appeals}. Regardless of whether there may be any recovery, Herrods shall never pursue 
collection of any of the $1,100,000 owing under this agreement against Bryan J. Espenschied 
and/or J. Richard Stark, and shall never pursue Espenschied Transport Corporation for any 
amount owing if the effect of so doing would expose the personal assets of either Bryan J. 
Espenschied or J. Richard Stark. 
3. Espenschied shall assign to Herrods all rights and claims it may have against 
DATS, excluding however claims for Defense Costs, as set forth in Exhibit 1 attached hereto 
("Assignment of Claims"). 
4. Espenschied shall fully pursue and prosecute all claims it may have against 
Wilshire, Fleetwood, DATS (to the extent assigned), and any other third party (collectively 
referred to as "Third Parties"), for liability to Espenschied arising from or relating to the 
Accident and/or the Herrods claims and/or efforts or the lack thereof to secure liability insurance 
coverage on the Trailer and other equipment. Espenschied shall fully cooperate and assist the 
attorneys in pursuing said claims against Third Parties. This duty to cooperate is a specifically 
bargained for term in this agreement, the violation of which shall be considered a material breach 
of the agreement. This duty to cooperate shalt include, but not be limited to, authorizing Herrods 
to consult with and use the experts Espenschied has retained in defense to the Herrods lawsuit. 
5. Espenschied will retain the law firm of CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C., to 
pursue Bspenschied's claims against the Third Parties, by executing the Contingency Fee 
Agreement to which this Settlement Agreement is attached as Exhibit A. 
6. The recovery, either from a partial settlement or from full resolution of 
Espenschied's claims against the Third Parties (or any of them), will be applied and distributed 
as follows: 
3 
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7. 
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a. to the costs oflitigation, including attorneys' fees and litigation expenses, as 
described in the Contingency Fee Agreement; 
b. to the Herrods until the full amount owing under this agreement has been 
paid; 
c. the remaining balance, if any, after the above distributions shall be paid to 
Espenschied. 
All decisions regarding settlement (including the amount), appeal, dismissal, 
waiver, release, abandonment, mediation, arbitration, witnesses, experts, and any other decisions 
regarding the claims and/or litigation against the Third Parties will be determined by the Herrods 
in their sole discretion, unless or until such time as the amount owing hereunder to the Herrods, 
including interest, is actually paid in full. This means that the Herrods will retain control of all 
matters regarding Espenschied's claims against the Third Parties, until the amount owing 
hereunder has been fully paid. Espenschied shall not have the right to object to or consent to any 
settlement or resolution of these claims. In the event the Herrods elect to settle all of 
Espenschied's claims for an amount less than the full amount owing hereunder, the Herrods shall 
provide Espenschied with a written satisfaction of all amounts owing hereunder and shall have 
no further claims against Espenschied. It is expressly agreed by the parties that the satisfaction 
of the amount owing hereunder is the goal and primary purpose of this Settlement Agreement 
8. Notwithstanding the above, Espenschied's indemnity claim against DATS for its 
Defense Costs shall not be subject to the teims of this agreement. 
9. This contract shall be governed by the laws of the state of Utah. 
10. The parties shall execute the necessary documents to effect the terms of any 
settlement of Espenschied's claims against the Third Parties. This will include Espenschied's 
4 
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signing a full and complete release of all claims against any Third Parties, and/or anyone else 
requested by the Herrods, and a dismissal of any litigation, regardless of whether or not 
Espenschied receives any amount relating to these claims. 
11. Espenschied represents and warrants that it has not released or waived any of its 
claims against the Third Parties and that it will not do so without the Herrods' written consent. 
12. Espenschied further represents and warrants that no one who is not a party to this 
a~eement has any interest in Espenschied' s claims against the Third Parties and Espenschied 
will not agree to provide anyone else with any interest in such claims without the Herrods' 
written consent. 
CONFLICT OF INTEREST WAIVER 
13. The parties hereby recognize that a potential conflict of interest exists in having 
the law firm of CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. act as attorneys for Espenschied 
when the attorneys also represent and have represented the interests of the Herrods in pursuing 
their personal injury and wrongful death claims. Nevertheless, Espenschied recognizes that 
recovery to Espenschied is incidental to the payment of the amount owing hereunder and that it 
is in Espenschied, s best interest to have this amount fully paid. Therefore, having fully explored 
with separate counsel the meaning and extent of this conflict of interest, Espenschied hereby 
waives any conflict of interest, and agrees to execute the Contingency Fee Agreement with 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. This is being done without duress and without regard to 
any representations on the part of the Herrods or CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. Upon 
execution of this Settlement Agreement and the Contingency Fee Agreement, to which this is 
made a part, the interests of Espenschied and the Herrods in pursuing the claims against the 
5 
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Third Parties for the satisfaction of the amounts owing hereunder, will be fully aligned: 
Dated this Vic, day of June, 2007. 
G:\EDSI\OOCS\16997\0001 \JJ3409.DOC 
6 
Catherine P. Herrod, individuaJ~y and on 
behalf of Scott Herrod, Taylor Herrod, 
Matthew Herrod and Elizabeth Herrod 
/ 1 • --.... 
.. }--{& . _....-.. -i 
l_,_.,. 1!_/lLl ' ( ' ' L,L(_ l~-i 
-. I JF Herrod 
{ 
ESPENSCHIBD TRANSPORT 
CORPORATION 
~'-L~~~~~d1-£_/~✓----
Ffryafi J.· 1fspcnscl1ied, individually 
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Exhibit 1 to Settlement Agreement 
@ 
@ 
@ 
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Assignment of Claims 
Espenschied Transport Corporation, Bryan J. Espenschied and J. Richard Stark 
(hereafter collectively referred to as "Assignors") hereby sell, assign and transfer to 
Catherine Herrod, individually and as parent and guardian of Scott Herrod, Taylor 
Herrod, Matthew Herrod and Elizabeth Herrod, and Niles and Janet Herrod (hereafter 
collectively referred to as "Herrods") any and all claims, rights and other interests 
Assignors may have against DATS Trucking, Inc. as it relates to the lease and/or sale of 
the trailer that was involved in the accident of January 30, 2005, wherein Kimball Herrod 
was killed, including but not limited to, claims for liability insurance, indemnity, 
consequential damages relating to the lack of coverage, and any other related claims. 
However, this assignment does not include Assignors' claim for attorneys fees and costs 
in defending the claims of the Herrods and pursuing the cross-claims against DATS 
Trucking; Inc., in the matter of Catherine Herrod, et al. v. DATS Trucking, Inc., et al., 
Civil No. 060700384, in the Second Judicial District Court, in Davis County, Utah, which 
specific claim Assignors reserve. 
Assignors acknowledge that by and through this assignment, Herrods shall have 
the right to pursue, settle, collect and recover on any of these assigned claims without the 
consent or authority of the Assignors. The Assignors shall execute any additional 
documents necessary to accomplish the purpose of this assignment. To the extent this 
assignment of claims is invalid in any regard, Assignors agree to pursue said claims in 
behalf of the Herrods, at Herrods' direction and expense. 
Dated this z,,,b day of June, 2007. 
G:\EDSl\DOCS\ 16997\000 l \JJ 3406.DOC 
ESPENSCHIED TRANSPORT 
CORPORATION 
¼ l-J 'l . <-=:-:> l / u· Udv·-·,-· I.:::-:::?-·~., ___ -:-/.,,..,.____ _ {JI. Richard Stalk, ind1 \·iduaUy 
,., 
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•··· .. 
UTAH STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM and CIVILITY 
1. Lawyers shall advance the legitimate interests of their clients, without 
reflecting any ill-will that clients may have for their adversaries, even if called upon to do 
so by another. Instead, lawyers shaU treat all other counsel, parties, judges, witnesses, 
and other participants in all proceedings in a courteous and dignified manner. 
2. Lawyers shall advise their clients that civility, courtesy, and fair dealing are 
expected. They are tools for effective advocacy and not signs of weakness. Clients 
have no right to demand that lawyers abuse anyone or engage in any offensive or 
improper conduct. · 
3. Lawyers shall not, without an adequate factual basis, attribute to other 
counsel or the court improper motive, purpose, or conduct. Lawyers should avoid 
hostile, demeaning, or humiliating words in written and oral communications with 
adversaries. Neither written submissions nor oral presentations should disparage the 
integrity, intelligence, morals, ethics, or personal behavior of an adversary unless such 
matters are directly relevant under controlling substantive law. 
4. Lawyers shall never knowingly attribute to other counsel a position or 
claim that counsel has not taken or seek to create such an unjustifted inference or 
otherwise seek to create a 11record" that has not occurred. 
5. Lawyers shaU not lightly seek sanctions and will never seek sanctions 
against or disqualification of another lawyer for any improper purpose. 
6. Lawyers shall adhere to their express promises and agreements, oral or 
written, and to all commitments reasonably implied· by the circumstances or by local 
custom. 
7. When committing oral understandings to writing, lawyers shall do so 
accurately and completely. They shall provide other counsel a copy for review, and 
never include substantive matters upon which there has been no agreement, without 
explicitly advising other counsel. As drafts are exchanged, lawyers shall bring to the 
attention of other counsel changes from prior drafts. 
8. When permitted or required by court rule or otheiwiset lawyers shall draft 
orders that accurately and completely reflect the court's ruling. Lawyers shall promptly 
prepare and submit proposed orders to other counsel and attempt to reconcile any 
differences before the proposed orders and any objections are presented to the court. 
9. Lawyers shall not hold out the potential of settlement for the purpose of 
foreclosing discovery, delaying trial, or obtaining other unfair advantage, and lawyers 
shall timely respond to any offer of settlement or inform opposing counsel that a 
response has not been authorized by the client. 
EXHIBIT B TO CONTINGENCY FEE AGREEMENT 
01779 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
... 
10. Lawyers shall make good faith efforts to resolve by stipulation undisputed 
relevant matters, particularly when it is obvious such matters can be proven, unless 
there is a sound advocacy basis for not doing so. 
11. Lawyers shall avoid impermissible ex parle communications. 
12. Lawyers shall not send the court or its staff correspondence between 
counsel, unless such correspondence is relevant to an issue currently pending before 
the court and the proper evidentiary foundations are met or as such correspondence is 
specifically invited by the court. · 
13. Lawyers shall not knowingly file or serve motions, pleadings or other 
papers at a time calculated to unfairly limit other counsel's opportunity to respond or to 
take other unfair advantage of an opponent, or in a manner intended to take advantage 
of another lawyer1s unavailability. 
14. Lawyers shall advise their clients that they reserve the right to determine 
whether to grant accommodations to other counsel in all matters not directly affecting 
the merits of the cause or prejudicing the clienes rights, such as extensions of time, 
continuances, adjournments, and admissions of facts. Lawyers shall agree to 
reasonable requests for extension of time and waiver of procedural formalities when 
doing so will not adversely affect their client's legitimate rights. Lawyers shall never 
request an extension of time solely for the purpose of delay or to obtain a tactical 
advantage. 
15. Lawyers shall endeavor to consult with other counsel so that depositions. 
hearings, and conferences are scheduled at mutually convenient times. Lawyers shall 
never request a scheduling change for tactical or unfair purpose. If a scheduling 
change becomes necessary, lawyers shall notify other counsel and the court 
immediately. If other counsel requires a scheduling change, lawyers shall cooperate in 
making any reasonable adjustments. 
16. Lawyers shall not cause the entry of a default without first notifying other 
counsel whose identity is known, unless their client's legitimate rights could be 
adversely affected. 
17. Lawyers shall not use or oppose discovery for the purpose of harassment 
or to burden an opponent with increased litigation expense. Lawyers shall not object to 
discovery or inappropriately assert a privilege for the purpose of withholding or delaying 
the disclosure of relevant and non-prot~cted information. 
18.. During depositions lawyers shall not attempt to obstruct the interrogator or 
object to questions unless reasonably intended to preserve an objection or protect a 
privilege for resolution by the court. "Speaking objections" designed to coach a witness 
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are impermissible. During depositions or conferences, lawyers shall engage only in 
conduct that would be appropriate in the presence of a judge. 
19. In responding to document requests and interrogatories, lawyers shall not 
interpret them in an artificially restrictive manner so as to avoid disclosure of relevant 
and non-protected documents or information, nor shall they produce documents in a 
manner designed to obscure their source, create confusion, or hide the existence of 
particular documents. 
20. Lawyers shall not authorize or encourage their clients or anyone under 
their direction or supervision to engage in conduct proscribed by these Standards. 
EXHIBIT B TO CONTINGENCY FEE AGREEMENT 
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